When will Democrats stand up for Democrats?

One thing that just drives me crazy is when partisan Democrats support Republicans when perfectly good Democrats are running for office or an appointed position. This is particularly mind-numbing when (a) Democrats hold the majority of the votes and (b) the person they're "supporting" is a hard-right Republican.

A case in point is the selection of a replacement for Phoenix City Councilman Greg Stanton. The City Council and the Mayor choose the replacement from a list of residents of the district who submitted their names for consideration. The Council then has about five days to make their choice. There are seven people who will make this selection, wanna guess how many are Democrats? More than enough.

So what's the problem? According to reports I'm hearing, they're all supporting former council Sal Diciccio: a self proclaimed, hard right wing Republican who supports Andy Thomas and Joe Arpaio and had the reputation of being "Mr. No." After he left the Council to run for Congress, those real estate developers whom DiCiccio roundly criticized while on the Council came out of the woodwork to give him him campaign contributions. He also became a developer himself.

He wrote an op-ed in 2007 --supporting-- Arpaio's wasteful lawsuits. In 1996, he supported the tobacco lobby's move to pass a state law making it tougher for cities to pass strict antismoking measures saying "kids will smoke anyway." In June of 2007 he wrote an op-ed in the Arizona Republic that implies that Hispanics are from a "corrupt culture."

And this is the guy the Democrats on the city council are endorsing?

WTF are they thinking?

So let me get this straight: people who want others to believe they're "moderate" and "thoughtful" are going to pick someone like Sal Diciccio for council and give a Republican with extreme views on law enforcement, sides with tobacco lobbyists and equates Hispanics with a "corrupt culture" an appointment to the council? They're willing to give THIS guy a leg up on the election in September when there are other qualified people up for the position? People like Dana Kennedy and Joanna Peters?

I just don't get it.

Arpaio's evil immigration sweeps

I'm a little late posting on this, but during his last showboat in the Buckeye area, Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio's deputies stopped a car containing a young woman with two young children for not having headlights on. It goes all downhill from there. Sal Reza happened to catch this on video and what he captured was chilling and heartless and immoral.

To make a long story short, the woman, Ciria Lopez, had a warrant out for driving on a suspended license. During the process, the Deputy leaves Lopez' children alone in the car and when he decides to arrest her, he tells the children to "kiss mommy goodbye because she's going back to Mexico." He then tries to chum the kids by giving them stuffed animals, like that'll make the pain easier to bear. You can read the details here on the Phoenix New Times web site (God forbid the rest of the Arizona media pick up on this.)

Some people give me a hard time for pointing this out, but this is the type of stuff the Nazi's did in the early 1930's. They gave kids toys for turning in Jews. To me, this is nothing more than a slow and deliberate ratcheting up of evil that just keeps getting worse and worse, and until good people stand up and say "put an end to this," it will continue. What type of person comes up with the idea of giving the children who are watching their parents being taken away from them a freakin' toy in order to buy their silence? How heartless and inhumane can you possibly get?



The New York Times and the Huffington Post have both picked up on this story and the outrage is beginning to build.

It's about time.

P.S. Stephen Lemons has an update posted on the New Times web site. It's worth a read.

Silliness around speed cameras

If there is an absolutely silly debate going on at the state capital it is the total waste of time arguing about speed cameras. The argument goes that the cameras are, as the new Pinal County Sheriff Paul Babeu said "a tax on all Arizonans." Others have called it a gimmick to raise money for the government.

A "tax on all Arizonans?" Am I missing something? The only way you pay is if you get caught speeding, which a violation of the law. If you don't speed, you don't pay. Sounds like a simple fine to me. I know. I paid one.

Republican Rep. Sam Crump of Anthem, said speed cameras are annoying, unfair, intrusive and even dangerous because of backups as motorists abruptly slow down near cameras. Unfair? To whom? If you're obeying the speed laws, they're not unfair to you. Intrusive? In what way? And dangerous? Maybe if they weren't speeding, they wouldn't have to "abruptly slow down."

What's funny about this is the people who are making the biggest stink are the "law and order" crowd. You know, the same folks that keep asking "what is it about illegal you don't understand?" Exactly. What is it about "don't speed" that they don't understand?

If the state, counties and municipalities make money off of the cameras off of people who are "breaking the law," why should anyone who isn't breaking speeding laws care? Don't want to give money to government, then don't drive more than 11 miles over the speed limit.

After all, if you're all for "law and order," that concept should be pretty easy to do.

Snatching Defeat from the Jaws of Victory – Arizona Democrats in 2008

Despite record voter registration gains, the election of a Democrat to the presidency, successful campaigns for Congress and the Arizona Corporation Commission and raising over $4M in private, PAC and corporate donations, Democrats in Arizona still managed to lose critically important legislative, county and local elections in 2008. The theories posited by the state Democratic Party include theoretical McCain coattails, Proposition 102 (the Gay Marriage ban), registration disadvantages, and supposed long lines at polling places depressing voter turnout. Others have suggested the reason was poor-quality candidates or campaigns with little or no "viability," with "viability" being defined as "no cash." Still others say it was the lack of a "30-district strategy" for the State and a lack of professionalism and arrogance on the part of State Party staff and those leading the "strategy."

The answer to the big question is easy and it all comes down to this: message, marketing and communication. Unfortunately, none of this was in play in Arizona in the 2008 election cycle and a golden opportunity was lost.

Historical Overview

At the end of the day, political campaigns are marketing campaigns. One of the fundamental basics of marketing is knowing your customer and knowing how to reach them. It's pretty obvious if you think about it. You can't convince anyone to buy your product if they (a) don't know what it is, (b) don’t know they need it, and (c) don't know where to get it.

Another given of marketing is recognizing people are fickle and resistant to change. Generally speaking, give people a good reason to switch brands and they will. Don't give them a good reason and they won't. In my view, the lack of understanding of these points resulted in the first big mistake the Arizona Democratic Party made in this election: they thought they knew their customer, they didn't give them reasons to switch brands and they didn't market to enough of the base.

The state's 2008 strategy was to target selected districts where the voter registration numbers are "competitive" or races that had in the recent past "been close." If you go back to previous elections, you’ll see the effects of this "targeted coordinated campaign." It has a questionable track record here in Arizona and at best should have received much more serious scrutiny before being the adopted strategy of choice for 2008. Consider these points:

1. In 2000, the AZ Senate was balanced 15-15 and the House had a Republican majority of 36-24.


2. In 2002 using the targeted strategy, (remember, this was after 9/11/01 and redistricting), Democrats got pounded: Senate Republicans took control 17-13, and the House went 38-19 Republican. Even picking up the Governorship by less than 1%, Democrats lost a net of seven seats.


3. In 2004, in another year where Democrats were supposed to take the White House, Democrats lost one seat in the AZ Senate (R's 18, D's 12) and Republicans increased their lead in the House 39-21.


4. In 2006, in a year the Maricopa County Democratic Party under Judy Kennedy decided to help every legislative candidate in the County, Democrats picked up six seats in the House (R's 33, D's 27) and one in the Senate (17-13).


5. In 2008, going back to a targeted strategy without any assistance from the County partiers and during a year of "Change" and expectation of Arizona Democrats to pick up four seats in the House to take the majority, Democrats lost two seats (35-25) in the House and lost one in the Senate (18-12), for a net loss of three seats.

Compare this now to the 50-state strategy instituted in 2005 by Democratic National Committee chairman Howard Dean for the 2006 election cycle. The notion of competing in all 50 states “at all levels” was roundly criticized by many Democratic Party leaders as “a waste of resources,” “wishful thinking” and even “Rumsfeldian.”

Between the 1994 and 2006 Congressional elections, Democrats were in the minority. In the 2006 election, Congressional Democrats picked up 31 seats, giving them a 233-202 majority. In 2008 --the second election where all states were targeted-- Democrats picked up an additional 21 House seats, increasing their majority to 257 to 178 and adding seven seats in the Senate for a 59-41 majority (including Al Franken), nearly a filibuster-proof majority.

There are other factors that would make a 50-state or 30-district strategy viable, including a solid message (not a discussion of topics), a solid voter registration and follow-up contact efforts, appealing candidates, and a viable media/Internet campaign. One of the largest impacts of this strategy is forcing Republicans to compete for all of their seats. That means they’re spending their money on “safe” seats, diverting volunteers from other campaigns and forced to be held accountable for their record and positions. They too have limited resources and better they spend it where they don’t want to than where they do.

A 30-district strategy also has the effect of using candidates in one race to help pull independent and other non-party-line voters over to the Democratic candidate. Not everyone votes party-line down the ballot. But we have to give them options to defect across to our side at every level. This is why having voter contacts in all areas of the state matters.

The record clearly indicates that working everywhere has a better payoff than ignoring large sections of voters. As Bob Dylan sings “You don’t need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows.” We don’t need to question whether this strategy will work. We know that answer. We have to ask why and we deserve a straight answer to why wasn’t it utilized here in 2008. This is one mistake Democrats cannot afford to make in 2010.

Who Was Targeted in 2008?

If Democrats are going to win elections, it is of paramount importance that the Party reach out to all Democrats, not just those some consultant or staff believes live in districts worthy of the effort.

According to information presented at the Fall 2008 ADP meeting in Tucson, the ADP focused it efforts only on those legislative races in these districts:

House: 9, 10, 11, 12, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 30
Senate: 5, 10, 12, 20 and 26

That's 11 out of 30 House Districts --a possible 22 out of 60 seats (37%)-- and five out of 30 Senate races (17%). There was overlap in only four districts: 10, 12, 20 and 26.

Based on the latest Secretary of State's registration numbers, the "safe" Democratic districts (e.g., Democratic registration majority over Republicans, although not necessarily independent voters) are 2, 5, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, and 29.

http://www.azsos.gov/election/voterreg/

At first glance, this makes sense because, as the argument went, it is best to "protect" incumbents and bet on "good Democrats" who are in "competitive" districts or where there are "open" seats. You don't help incumbents in "safe" districts because they are; well, "safe." Here's how that played out in practical terms in the 2008 election:

Arizona House of Representatives

Democrats had House incumbents running in districts 2, 5, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 23, 24, 26, 27, and 28.

There were open House seats in 2, 3, 6, 9, 12, 18, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 29, and 30.

A total of 48 Democrats were running in --every—legislative district in the state.

This means the ADP targeted incumbents in only four of 13 (30%) legislative districts in the state (10, 23, 24, and 26) and worked in only seven of 13 districts (53%) with open seats (9, 12, 20, 23, 25, 26 and 30), although there were Democrats running in all 30 districts across the state. The ADP did not provide any meaningful help to Democratic candidates in 19 out of 30 (63%) legislative districts.

Arizona State Senate

Democrats had Senate incumbents running in 13 districts: 2, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29.

There were open Senate seats in five districts 1, 18, 25, 29 and 30.

Democrats were running for Senate seats in 26 districts EXCEPT 8, 19, 21 and 22, which means that the Arizona Democratic Party gave little or no support to 21 Democrats running for the Arizona State Senate, leaving these candidates to largely fend for themselves.

Again, this all sounds reasonable: you let those in “safe” districts fend for themselves; you target those districts where the voter registration numbers are distinctly or leaning towards the Democrats; and you ignore the rest because, as was said too many times “they don’t have a chance.” After all, why spend resources in places you can’t win? There are several problems with that thinking and the dominant problems are these:

• You lose contact with the voters you need up or down-ticket


• You fail to develop the name recognition those candidates who do not win will need if they choose to run at a future date.


• It’s dangerous to presume all other-party incumbents will win because they don’t (and won't if we do it right).

Impact of Targeting on Registered Voters

Voter registration numbers for non-targeted districts show painfully well how the selective targeting strategy is a bad idea. The registration figures provided by the Arizona Secretary of State shows 615,000 registered and active Democrats reside in non-targeted districts. That’s over 60% of all registered and active Democrats registered to vote in Arizona. Over half of these voters (337,045) live in Maricopa County, meaning nearly two-thirds of Maricopa County Democrats did not live in targeted districts.

This doesn’t take into account the over 1.1 million independent and Republican voters who live in non-targeted districts. All told, 1.7 million registered voters live in non-targeted districts in Arizona. Through the state party’s strategy, these voters were largely spared any contact from any Democratic candidate—1.7 MILLION voters. How can that be considered a wise decision, especially in light of previous elections have been decided by 3% or less?


Source: Arizona Secretary of State

How is it possible to capture a majority of the seats in the legislature when the party doesn’t even communicate with the majority of its own voters? How can it win a majority if it doesn’t reach out to at least half of all voters? If we make no attempt to talk to these voters, then who will? The answer is: the Republicans.

As a practical example, Maricopa County Attorney candidate Tim Nelson needed 43,323 votes (half the win margin plus one) to defeat Andy Thomas. Could those votes have been found in the 337,045 Democrats who lived in non-targeted districts in Maricopa County that didn’t get a mailer, didn’t get a phone call or didn’t get a flyer?

Democrat Sam George needed 1,177 votes (half the win margin plus one) to win a seat and a Democratic majority on the Arizona Corporation Commission. Granted his campaign had other problems, but could those votes not have been found in the 615,000 Democrats who lived in non-targeted districts across Arizona?

The answer is “Yes,” which is supported by the marketing point that no one will buy your product if they don’t know it exists. You wouldn’t try to make something the most sought-after brand in Arizona if you deliberately choose to ignore two-thirds of consumers over the age of 18, but that’s exactly what happened.

Some will argue there’s a difference between marketing a product and marketing a candidate. If that’s true, then explain the “solar team’s” win. Sam George, Paul Newman and Sandra Kennedy understood the marketing aspects of a campaign. State party staff criticized the team’s strategy as a “waste of money” and gave it little chance of success. What they missed was the focus of getting the candidate’s message and names out to as wide an audience as possible would be what gets them elected.

Issues Do Not A “Message” Make

The message the “Solar Team” gave voters was simple and direct and it resonated. It pointed out that the Republicans who controlled the Commission were obstructing solar and renewable energy development and electing the “team” would ensure that Arizona becomes a focal point of solar and renewable energy development and generation. They said: “Elect Republicans in and you’ll never get solar energy in Arizona that saves the environment and reduces your electric bill or our national dependence on foreign oil.” It gave voters a reason to vote for the Democrats and it worked.

Compare that message with the message from our legislative candidates: we need better schools, better healthcare and jobs. These are important and no one will question their importance, but from a marketing standpoint, they weren’t packaged into a message that would resonate with voters as clearly as the “solar teams” message did. They didn’t give the voters a reason to vote out incumbent Republicans because the Republicans too were saying we need better schools, better healthcare and jobs, they just packaged in with the wrapper of higher taxes if Democrats were elected and threw in the divisional issues of gay marriage and immigration to heat up emotions.

After the 2004 presidential loss of John Kerry, former Clinton strategist Paul Begala recalls asking a Kerry advisor to explain the campaign’s message; the reply was JHOS – Jobs, Health, Oil, Security. “That’s not a message,” says Begala, “when Bush’s message is ‘I will protect you from those who will murder you and [Kerry won’t]’ – and we’re saying JHOS? C’mon.”

The comparative Republican message in Arizona in 2008 was this: “We will lower school costs by putting more kids in taxpayer funded charter schools because they can operate more cheaply. We will decrease health costs by getting more people in health savings accounts and kicking out ‘illegals’ that drive up costs. We will stimulate job growth by cutting business taxes, and as a bonus we’ll also keep you safe from those ‘illegals’ who are robbing our stores, stealing your jobs and killing our cops.”

It doesn’t matter that these Republican strategies are failures or that their “facts” are wrong. It doesn’t matter the Democrats may have better solutions. Anyone who has read Maslow’s “Hierarchy of Needs” or Drew Weston’s “The Political Brain” understands why the Republican message resonated and the Democratic one did not: it did not appeal to people’s emotions. We must develop messages that touch people’s emotions in addition to their intellect.

But there’s more to it than that. E.J. Dionne wrote in his book “Why Americans Hate Politics” about the difference between policy issues and policy problems. He writes issues are what politicians use to divide the voters and problems are tangible things that can be solved by crafting policy. This means messages have to have a coherent theme and an emotional appeal as Westin says, but they also have to be specific policy proposals that address real problems people identify with. If they are going to be rational appeals, then they have to be straightforward solutions fixing concrete problems.

It’s not the topics or the way Democrats would deal with each of those issues that are the problem. It has nothing to do with our solutions. Our “message” simply was not packaged in a manner that motivated voters to reject incumbents and elect Democrats. There was no concerted effort to focus on the many and significant Republican failures. Look at Obama’s message of hope and change and how electing him will make our lives better and our country safer and put an end to the two wars we’re fighting. He took great pains to paint Republicans with a very broad brush of policy and programmatic failure. We simply had no comparable message in Arizona.

This problem can be traced in part to relying too heavily on polls to tell us what people think. Polls are snapshots in time and survey responses are based on how the questions are worded. Likert scaled responses, however, do not provide sufficient insights into the emotions or concerns people have around a given issue nor do they necessarily take into account external information on things such as external trends or events, so these external influences wind up being ignored, to our detriment.

As a result, we wind up “understanding” issues on a one-to-five scale and not by listening to what people are saying in conversation. This has the unfortunate impact of our ignoring issues that “aren’t Democratic issues” even though the Republicans may talk about them all the time. Whenever that happens we lose those arguments by default. Over time, these defaulted issues begin to add up and that’s when Republicans and pundits say Democrats have no message and no solutions. This self-inflicted wound can and must be avoided whenever possible.

Immigration is a prime example of this problem. It was made very clear that no legislative candidate was to talk about immigration unless asked. If they were asked, they then were told to give very generic answers about securing the border. Nearly every Republican candidate for state, county or local public office in Arizona spoke about immigration from a crime, economic and jobs perspective. Few Democrats were willing to do the same. The state’s party directive effectively opened the door for Republicans to say Democrats are soft on crime and for “open borders.” The only proof they needed was that Democrats weren’t talking about it. Remember Paul Begala’s and Weston’s comments and Maslow Hierarchy?

Another example of this was the 2006 election of Jackie Thrasher to the House and her defeat in 2008. In 2006, Jackie went to meeting after meeting and said to people “If the Republicans are so good at education, why are we ranked 49th? If they’re so good with tax policy and controlling revenues, then why have we had so many deficits?” She won, nearly beating the incumbent House Speaker, Jim Weiers. Jump forward to 2008. Jackie was took a defensive approach, focusing on her record and not the continued failures of the Republican leadership and their responsibility for the budget deficit. Her opponent, on the other hand, talked a message of fear of government, fear of outsiders and fear of fiscal and social irresponsibility if Democrats took control of the House. He won.

The bottom line is we simply failed to learn from previous elections and we repeated the same message mistakes, which is mistaking topics and positions for a message. They’re not the same and we cannot afford to make those mistakes again.

A Plan for Action and Improvement

The election in 2010 is significant in many ways. First, all of the major state offices are up that year, including Governor, Attorney General, Treasurer, Secretary of State and State Superintendent of Public Instruction. Next, whomever controls the legislature in 2010 will have significant influence how legislative district are redrawn. Finally, actions by the all-Republican state leadership could allow us to present a case of a right-wing gone out of control and an effective Obama administration could give voters another opportunity to take a closer look at Arizona Democrats. These opportunities mean the party must take a hard look at the strategies and the people who lead it to 2008’s disappointments and take corrective measures.

While the aforementioned strategic problems contributed to our losses, organizational problems compounded already strained relations between the state party, county party and campaign staff. Complaints about state party staff range from indifference to rudeness to arrogance when dealing with candidates and volunteers. Here are a few of the more common complaints:

• New candidates or those deemed “with no chance” were ignored by the state party at exactly the time they should have been given help.


• Some campaigns were unable to raise money and prove “viability” because state party staff openly discouraged donors from contributing to those campaigns at meetings and in the media.


• Requests to the state party by candidates with limited resources to participate in robocalls or literature walks were denied because they did not “pay to play.”


• Candidates who shared a public dais with party leaders or Democratic elected officials where ignored in public comments or acknowledgements.


• Slate pieces were discarded from walks because senior state party staff believed handing them out potentially hurt other Democratic candidates.


• Promised organized walks were canceled hours before they were scheduled to begin.


• County party organizations were told to “butt-out” of providing assistance to legislative candidates.


• Polling data was not shared among all campaigns, only those who “paid to play.”


• Incumbent elected Democrats shied away from endorsing other Democrats in a timely manner or even at all, often at the direction of the state party staff.


• A request by one candidate to hold a press conference at party HQ to defend himself from Republican smear was denied simply because of whom he was.


• A $250,000 donation was made to the state party with hope that some of it would trickle down to county offices and races. That never occurred.
  

No Democrat who chooses to run for public office at any level in the state of Arizona deserves to have their viability questioned, access to data, access to technical assistance and training, access to technology or access to expertise blocked by anyone working for the state Democratic party. These candidates make up the Democratic farm team and only the voters should decide whether they’re suitable for office or not. Clearly exceptions may have to be made, but arbitrary selection based upon staff opinions, the opinions of consultants, or personality conflicts is unprofessional, unproductive and unacceptable. State party staff cannot be in the business of individually picking “winners” or “losers.” Those who acted in such a manner should be replaced with professionals who treat candidates and county officers and volunteers with respect and courtesy. Refusing to help any candidate or county office in legitimate and appropriate ways should be grounds for termination at all levels.

One of the reasons many believe that Republicans are better at winning elections is they stick together no matter what. Their PCs are trained and motivated and have electronic tools to help them communicate with voters in their districts and precincts. They are expected to contact new residents and the party provides them the necessary data to do so. Candidates get party assistance and support regardless of their perceived chances of victory and they compete everywhere. This capability and this mentality must become part of the Arizona Democratic Party.

1. A priority must be to strengthen all County Party organizations, both urban and rural and create capacities within each to provide direct assistance to candidates, legislative districts, precinct committeepersons and clubs as needed. Training, technology, strategy assistance, media and public relations expertise should all be part of these efforts as well as a more deliberate cash investment to support staff, infrastructure and campaigns.


2. A priority must be the development and investment in the next cadre of Democratic candidates for public office. To do this, beginning at the county level, potential candidates should be identified, contacted and trained well in advance of the start of the general election cycle. Democrats can no longer afford to wait until the last possible moment to identify or train new candidates. There is sufficient knowledge of Arizona elections and campaigns to well prepare our candidates. This must be an on-going process.


3. No candidate is worth zero investment. Candidates must be guaranteed the state and county party will be there to support them with resources, endorsements, meetings with elected Democrats, access to polling data and access to the party’s databases in ways that allows them to properly and effectively plan and finance their campaigns. The attitude must be “how can we help” rather than “how can you help us.”


4. The only goal of the Arizona State Democratic Party can be the election of as many Democrats to public office as possible. While federal and high-level state elections are important, so are county and local elections. It is this base of elected officials that we draw from for future elections and we cannot expect to become a majority party again if we concentrate only on those elections where there are numerically favorable registration numbers of Democrats versus Republicans. We must pursue independent voters and those in largely Democratic or independent districts.


5. Dr. Howard Dean’s 50-state strategy has clearly shown in the last two election cycles that competing everywhere and using the Internet intelligently is the secret to Democratic success. It is unfortunate that strategy was not duplicated in Arizona and we should have known better. Significant managerial, strategic and policy mistakes were made and those who purposefully chose to ignore the concerns and suggestions of those within the party who saw the problem for what it was and ignored it should be replaced with professionals who have the capacity to listen and take council.

We can no longer afford to base our election strategies simply on the ways we’ve done it before, or based on the recommendations of consultants. There is a great amount of wisdom in our county and local organizations, our clubs and in our partners and we need to be open to new and different ways of doing things. They say the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. The targeted strategy, the poor treatment of candidates and of county and local party offices has failed us time and time again and it cannot be repeated.

It is time for a change in the Arizona Democratic Party. It is time to build a functional organization that listens, is creative, and is responsive and reaches out to all of voters all of the time. Only with these and other changes can Arizona Democrats become the majority party we know it can be.

That is why I am a candidate for Vice Chair of the Arizona Democratic Party. I ask for your support and your vote.